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ABSTRACT: In the context of a specific understanding of ethics and communication, we discuss what seems 
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and we then underscore some major issues that the prevalence of expertise in our society raise in the practice of 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Issues in science communication from an ethical perspective are numerous but they are not 
abundantly debated as of yet. Communication Ethics as a field has not until very recently 
showed a specific interest for science communication as such (Johannesen, 2008); the same 
goes for philosophy of communication. Even though I have been involved in research projects 
of an interdisciplinary nature for many years, and as such have had to reflect on the 
characteristics of different disciplines (Létourneau, 2008), this paper does not stem from a STS 
background; the writer arrived at the issues debated here by the actual confrontation with 
expertise either in water governance committees at the local and regional level, or by 
discussing with colleagues inside ethics committees, and also by having to work in 
interdisciplinary research teams. Having discussions about participative governance requires 
me to reflect on expertise as being an unavoidable part of it.  
 The first task of any philosophy as I see it is to clarify the terms of discussion, while 
presuming as little as possible in terms of shared presuppositions with readers. In practical 
philosophy and in ethics, there are also directions of action to discuss, which forcibly involve 
ends, means, values and norms (Dewey, 1939). And what would be an ethical perspective? 
Since the answer to that question is not so obvious, and without entering into all the details of a 
thorough discussion which would be impossible here, I will furnish some notes on my own 
perspective. I support a distinction between the ethical and the moral sides of human 
experience, seeing them as distinct but in a continuum. On the one side we have reflectivity, 
critical distance towards norms and principles that are always present, whatever they are, in 
practical use; and on the other side, we have precisely the normative elements as they are 
somehow in force in the situation, among which we should take especially into account rules 
and values. Furthermore, ethical reflection certainly implies reflection and choices among 
conceptions of the good, whereas moral issues are most of the time concerned with questions 
of justice and equity.  
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  This distinction of sides in a dynamic relationship has to do with our historical situation 
as social and cultural human beings, on questions where evolution is a normal part of life, 
while acknowledging that ethical reflection does not start in a vacuum, and neither should we 
understand it in purely behavioral terms (in terms of what to do or not to do). This distinction 
between the ethical and the moral has been forwarded by philosophers like Rawls, Habermas 
and Ricoeur in the preceding decades, each time with specific meanings (Dosse, 2001; 
Habermas, 1990; Heath, 2001; Ingram, 2010; Rawls, 1999; Ricoeur, 1984).1 Let us assume that 
norms can be discussed in the context of a plurality of conceptions of the good, a situation 
which is normal in a democratic society, even if one’s orientation towards values has somehow 
to come first, as Ricoeur explained. But I also hold a situational perspective that can be called 
applied ethics if we understand that ethics cannot be understood as a simple application of 
principles to situations (Létourneau, 2012). Rather, situations have to be carefully studied, 
researched and documented to be able to understand the contextual and normative elements 
that have to be considered in the specific case at hand, which also comes with its load of 
constraints. With ethics seen as a capacity of reflection and decision making among a plurality 
of normative elements, we will understand that ethical questioning has to do with our way of 
understanding situations and people, all elements that are better grasped either in a context of 
dialogue between relevant actors, or at a minimum in taking into account the meaning seen by 
actors in their own action, all of which is coherent with an interpretive perspective in human 
sciences. This is what I call a hermeneutical approach of ethical questions, and it can take the 
form of a hermeneutics of organizational life (Létourneau, 2013), the organization being the 
basic level of structured social arrangements that are the result of human organizing especially 
in and through communication (Taylor & Van Every, 2000).  
 Let us say another few words about this notion that is most of the time taken for 
granted and considered obvious, communication itself. For me communication is relational to 
people and other referents; it is not to be understood as a simple transfer of information from 
emitter A to receiver B, as in Shannon and Weaver’s (1947) famous model (as cited in 
Shannon, 1993). It involves meaning, interpreting, acting with words and sentences, and 
interacting between communicators in a kind of proactive way (indicated already by Dewey’s 
word of “transaction,” which implies the possibility to co-organize) (Dewey and Bentley, 
1948). Communication as organization, in the active and dynamic sense, is more and more the 
focus of attention in communication science studies (Robichaud & Cooren, 2013). Since it is 
relational, communication is destined and related to specific people, inside what the situation 
permits, and it is aimed at being relevant somehow to specific actors towards specific 
issues/problems. 
 To see in a clearer light what this means in the present discussion, let’s start by some 
enumeration of possible situations of communication that involve people in science; we will 
then indicate what is in focus here. Any science communication will be directed to some public 
or publics, to addressees that might be specialized or not, familiarized to a variable degree with 
the subject treated or not at all. There is the case of a science communication in general media, 
like in a newspaper article; this poses specific problems and involves decisions about the level 
of complexity that is required and adequate for that kind of medium. I will not treat this 
                                                
1 The authors to which we refer here share the usefulness of the distinction, but do not develop the exact same 
understanding of the relevant notions. For instance, if Rawls and Habermas both support some priority of the 
right over the good, Ricoeur will give the first place to the ethical considerations. It is impossible to enter here 
with full details into this discussion. The question of the priority does not have to be settled here.  
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problem here. If the communication is destined and addressed to members of the specific 
scientific community to which the speaker/communicator belongs, rules of acceptability and 
criteria of relevance, of relative novelty inside a research community, will be expected and 
acknowledged normally on both sides. Members then share notably a field of investigation, 
which I often call an object domain, plus some common parameters, on top of basic and always 
relevant criteria of clarity and intelligibility that have to be met (Grice, 1989). If the 
communication is destined to people outside the specific scientific community, we can have a 
whole variety of situations to look at. For instance, the communication could still aim at 
scientists in a family of disciplines that have something in common with the speaker’s field, 
even though they might not be members of his/her specific discipline. Instead, we can have 
cases of an informed public which has some basis in the relevant disciplines, or people that 
come from a variety of backgrounds and have no specific knowledge of the field outside a 
general and mostly vague idea. This latter situation might be quite common if we want some 
involvement of scientists in social debates, with people that come from a broad range of 
horizons and social backgrounds.  
 The previous remarks are only touching issues of publics in front of scientists and their 
communication. But what is the general frame into which this communication is situated? We 
can for instance imagine the communication as being situated inside the typical Technical 
rationality frame well-described by Donald A. Schön (1930–1997), to future users of the 
knowledge, people that have application interests toward the knowledge and come with 
specific demands (Schön, 1983; Schön & Argyris, 1991). In that perspective we have science 
experts that see themselves as having something to communicate to people; they have basic 
principles and knowledge that could and have to be applied by technicians or laypersons on the 
field. While nowadays this technical model might look a little suspicious because of his “air de 
grandeur” or paternalistic outlook, we have no reason to doubt that it is still very popular, even 
though the reflective practitioner model, constructed by Schön in contrast to the technical 
rationality model, has gained ground to rethink the professional’s role and the expert’s role in 
society. The reflective practitioner is opened to uncertainty, recognizes limitations of expertise, 
and takes an adaptive stance in front of difficulties, renouncing ready-made answers. Still, for 
most people, among whom are many government officials and research foundations, science is 
interesting as long as it sheds some light on some practical issue, if and when it furnishes some 
applicable models or concepts. For instance, and to avoid undue generalization, the industry 
and business communities in Canada, and the federal level of the present (2013) government of 
that country are certainly proponents of this perspective. Under that understanding, industrial 
and organizational actors are waiting for science to help them become more efficient, without 
ever questioning in what direction this “efficiency” is going. In such a perspective, we fail to 
recognize that any available data needs to be interpreted, that most of the time it requires 
contextualization to be correctly understood. We also then miss the phenomena of framing and 
naming that comes before any problem solving, always supposing that only this technical view 
is the relevant goal of any science.  
 Here the contextual question I will consider will be limited. And again, the point of 
departure is actual multifaceted groups that have to work together. I will look at the problem of 
scientific expertise in relationship to a given group of persons that are interested in a specific 
social issue, for instance, water issues at the regional level or ethical issues which can be 
treated in part by the scientist. This expert would probably not be the only one to have a say, 
but still his or her contribution might be of importance and required. The scientist is then 
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considered as particularly knowledgeable in a specific field. Citizens might be interested by 
this expert’s communication, for instance, in the process of forming their ideas about a socio-
technical controversy (let us give as an example of IVF procedures), or if they are participating 
in a consultation on environmental issues that are local, for instance, having to decide if the 
level of water in a lake can be diminished so as to facilitate repairs in a dam. On one side, 
quality of the lake generally speaking might be affected, causing a surplus of oxygen, plant life 
and bacteria, while on the other side, issues of security are present if the dam needs repairs.2 
The citizens might be interested and involved, but might not necessarily possess all the 
knowledge and experience that would be required to be able to construct an informed and 
personal position on a given issue, or to form a common idea that would be able to motivate 
collective decision.  
 It is the kind of problem that can be found and treated in the context of what Callon, 
Lascoumes and Barthes (2001/ 2011) call “hybrid forums,” e.g., forums in which some public 
policy question can be considered not only among experts, but also with laypersons, citizens 
that might have other skills and expertise but outside the expert’s domain as such. In Callon et 
al.’s (2001/2011) book, expert and layperson are face-to-face, and there is a choice to avoid 
generalizing the notion of expert; the expert is always the technical expert or specialist, even 
though the aim is to establish a new parity between the knowledge of the specialist and other 
forms of knowledge (parité). The proposal of an “hybrid forum” provides us with good ideas 
to address the issues of an ethical communication between scientists and the interested publics, 
in specific cases of socio-technical controversies (they will talk of a model of technical 
democracy) (Callon et al., 2001/2011) . For these authors, social movements that contest some 
socio-technical controversy like the development of genetic therapy, or the implantation of a 
high-speed train in a given region (TGV) do constitute such hybrid forums, but these can also 
be organized, e.g., structured as to be able to treat issues. Indirectly, this reflection might also 
shed some light on issues of ethical communication between scientists, which might just be 
another case of incapacity to “translate,” meaning here to reformulate in vernacular language 
what is encoded by the expert. But to understand better this proposal, we also have to ask the 
question of what is expertise.  
2. UNDERSTANDING THE QUESTION OF EXPERTISE 
Let us recall how the question of expertise can be understood and why it is necessary to use it, 
even if it brings along a series of problems. Scientific expertise comes of course from a long 
history of development, which can be seen as a tremendous effort over generations. And for 
individuals who have mastered some given expertise, it represented an important investment in 
terms of time and money, even in a public system of education. Experts do have a privileged 
position in society, for they are more and more recognized as indispensable; for instance, 
regularly the media will call for their help in the process of trying to enlighten some difficult or 
controversial issue (Létourneau, 2013 b). When we need them, as citizens or public officials 
we will refer to experts with the aim of avoiding risks. Diverse costs are associated with those 
kinds of situations, whether or not we have the choice to call experts for help. 
 Scientific experts have particular terms and vocabularies that characterize their 
relatively closed communities and render their understanding complex for laypersons; inside 
                                                
2 An example based on a real case which cannot be presented here with details.  
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their respective communities of experts, they share these specific series of words and concepts, 
and are therefore able to understand each other easily. Their terminologies come also with 
acronyms and abbreviations not known by the general public; all these terms permit them to 
communicate rapidly between them. These languages can become particularly abstract, and 
obscure, a phenomenon that can be accentuated with the use of mathematical formalism. Their 
language will represent a challenge of translatability and of understandability; they have a 
challenge to be sufficiently understandable and will need to be able to reformulate themselves 
in the layperson’s terms, which looks like a form of translation.3 As was explained by Bruno 
Latour, expertise (as much as scientific theories) are like black boxes; we have access to the 
results of their workings in terms of their prescriptions or proposed “solutions,” but the general 
public does not understand how the scientists came to their conclusion, e.g., the inner workings 
of the expertise (Latour, 1988). The tricky part is given when an expert language continues to 
use lay terms but gives them a technical sense that is not necessarily obvious or apparent for 
the layperson. A good example of this is the word governance: it has different technical 
meanings in different fields of practice and reflection. For instance, the meaning of the word 
governance is not the same in management and organizational studies as it is in the field of 
development studies and natural resources management (Létourneau, 2009).  
 Expert communities have sometimes a complete monopoly over knowledge of strategic 
value, a fact which implies an important power. This often comes with an unspoken form of 
potential blackmail, even if it is not exerted: this is very sensible (but most of the times 
unspoken), to give an example, in health issues in particular. Obviously if we look at specific 
persons operating in a given expertise domain, this does not have to be intentional on their part 
or even conscious. But the fact is that if medical acts were to be unprofessionally executed, this 
would have consequences for the patients, for the credibility of the profession, and for the 
general health system considered. This might be part of the reason why, on the other side, as 
members of society, we also need to exert a certain control over the expert: their important 
powers and responsibilities represent important costs and risks, whether they are public or 
private. If asked, groups of experts will prefer some form of self-regulation; among other 
reasons, some will remark that you have to be an expert yourself to evaluate the experts. Fields 
of expertise are reserved domains, domains of practice; any expert is recognized by a 
community of expertise. There are social requirements and expectations in front of expertise 
that most of the time take the form of stereotypes, and experts also have representations of the 
general knowledge about their profession, on which they rely. In the case of professions, 
deontological codes can function as a way to express what is expected by and from these 
professions, since those documents are public and devised to protect and inform the public at 
the same time as they serve to express a profession’s understanding of its basic rules. Of 
course, no deontological code will suffice to cover all possible situations, requirements, and 
contexts of practice. Establishing forms of hierarchies is a certain way to deal with issues 
inside fields of expertise. 
                                                
3 In Callon et al. (2001/2011), translation takes a specific meaning, as they use the term to describe the process 
of science formation itself: from the “outside world” to the laboratory, among other phenomena in three basic 
steps. Here I start from a simple fact: the same word in two different vernacular languages, one formed inside 
an expertise domain and the other independently from it, will not have the same meaning. For instance, the 
word “uncertainty” does not have the same meaning in a climatologist’s paper and in the politician’s decision- 
making process. In one side, this is a normal situation; on the other, that might be a good argument to delay 
any action.  
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 To be a specialist and to be an expert: these two kinds of categories can function as 
equivalents, but sometimes specialization is invoked as a kind of super-expertise, most of the 
times in a specified sub-field. To obtain, conserve and renew expertise requires time, energy 
and money, either on an individual level or on the level of organizations and society in general.  
 For many reasons, most of the time the term expert is not used to characterize 
craftsmanship, even though there is no formal reason it should be kept only for technical and 
scientific people. In a larger sense, carpenters and automobile mechanics are experts in the 
same way as a surgeon is one; in each case, you can have exemplary or extraordinary expertise 
in a given field. Computer technicians, philosophers, chefs and oenologists can be experts in 
their own way and sense; from the outside of their respective domains, they can be seen 
globally as experts, because the layperson is not in a position to really evaluate the expertise. 
To be called experts inside their field, they have to be recognized as such inside their relevant 
communities of practice. Expertise can then be used by ignoramus (relatively speaking) in 
front of a single person, or function as a category of preeminence inside a given field of 
practical/theoretical knowledge. From the outside, any knowledge that is not obvious, that is 
learnable, has practical relevance, and that characterizes a special group of people can be seen 
as a form of expertise. This being said, of course the very expression of expertise refers us to a 
context of social hierarchy, since by definition an expertise is not given to everybody.  
 Of course, professions have a status that come from an expertise that is a complex set 
of knowledge, competences, capacities and abilities. On one side they are learned with a 
certain level of difficulty, and their exercise comes with special responsibilities towards the 
public. The professions established themselves progressively as experts that are indispensable 
for treating a certain class of problems; their training is constructed as something long and 
complex, not easily accessible; and experts constitute a kind of caste that has special niches. 
Lesser practices or know-hows do not share this prestige; their field might in some cases be 
seen as not exclusive. There are different ways to look at experts: as a high-standing caste or as 
something that comes with any practical knowledge that is both non-obvious, learnable, 
practical and needing specialization.4 Relations of expertise to practice are recognized more 
and more and integrated, in many cases, inside the professional’s formation, in the form of 
internships or on-the-job training. More and more, a technical understanding of expertise 
(Schön, 1983) is overcome by considerations of adaptability, openness to complexity, 
uncertainty, and issues of value conflicts, which typically cannot be resolved while staying 
inside the technical approach. Forcibly, conflicts of value refer to persons and situations and to 
judgment acts that have to be performed by individuals and by groups. Phenomena of value 
conflicts might lead people to hybrid forums, dialogue practices, or consensus-building 
conferences. However, it is not clear to which points those kinds of issues can ever be reduced 
                                                
4 See, for instance, the English, French and German articles (among others) on Wikipedia about expertise and 
the expert (the list of articles is given at the end of this paper). The first group of articles (in English) suggest 
quite an open view, between adaptive expertise and a vision of it as a continuing process, whereas the second 
group pleads for the characteristics of a technical perspective: a specific group of experts expressing, for 
instance, a juridical point of view, on issues like insurance, intellectual property, and real estate. References to 
adaptive expertise are also found in the English article “Expert” (n.d.), which pursues the distinction between 
“artisans” and “virtuosos,” the second group being in a continued learning process whereas the first one’s 
members are in routine processes. Obviously those dichotomies are not reserved to craftsmen but are also 
relevant for university professors, doctors and engineers; one of the German texts (“Expertise,” n.d.) works 
especially on art expertise, while the “Experte” (n.d.) article looks especially at cognitive science reflections, 
plus discussions on the passage from laity to expertise. 
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to being the domain of a specific and complementary form of expertise. Even if philosophers 
and ethicists have training to treat values and norms, obviously they do not have a recognized 
monopoly on those questions, no more than any other group like law officers, theologians, or 
logicians, to give a few examples.  
3. PROBLEMS OF UNDERSTANDABILITY AND VERIFICATION 
Understandability of science is especially useful when the participation of the public is deemed 
necessary, sometimes with the aim of sound policy making and/or of an efficient policy 
enactment afterwards. In science communication, people have been discussing the need for 
vulgarization, while others might also think in terms of translation: using other terms, giving 
examples, using metaphors and other figures of speech, etc., might help us, poor ignoramuses, 
understand better the expert’s language. But this might be seen as imprecision, going with 
uncertainty that the message will be correctly understood; rhetorical abuse of the publics might 
not be impossible at an extreme of simplification. Do we then have to choose between 
oversimplification of issues on one side, and systematic or gross misunderstandings on the 
other side?  
 But this is only one side of the issue of understandability. The specialization that comes 
with expertise can be seen metaphorically as enlarging glasses; they permit to focus and 
provide extraordinary results, but they also come with knowledge losses that are more and 
more recognized. By focussing so much and by being analytical, they face the risk of 
excluding important aspects of specific realities. In communication contexts, experts or 
specialists might have difficulties in understanding the terminology of other experts and 
specialists, therefore missing essential parts of what they are meaning. These others happen to 
have their own concepts, methods, terms, or approaches. The experts might also misunderstand 
the laypersons that try to explain to them the specifics of their situation and that refer to some 
practical knowledge about the issue at hand in which they might be well-established. More 
than that, experts may lack a more general knowledge about the object domain in which they 
specialize. They might ignore dimensions of problems and situations that lie outside their field 
of expertise as such, for which the need for a layperson’s expertise is often required.  
 Difficulty of accessibility of the expert’s language and knowledge for the layperson is 
also an important problem. Non-experts have a difficult time controlling the validity, , or 
sufficiency of the expert’s analysis or advice. They are not always in the position to know 
(Walton, 2006) if the expert is isolated inside his community of expertise, e.g., to which point 
he/she is a genuine expert. He might not even be sure of the value of that kind of expertise in 
general to treat specific kinds of problems. Does the layperson know, for instance, the degree 
of success of this or that type of intervention? In certain institutional and organizational 
contexts where internal experts have been laid off (most of the time to make economies on 
staff costs; this has been seen in governments), decision makers can find themselves depending 
crucially on external experts. Not only, then, do they rely on external sources, but they will 
sometimes have to call for the help of other experts to control the discourse of the first experts, 
for a number of reasons (notably, costs that get out of proportion). This situation of relative 
exclusivity and rarity protects the expert; his or her difference validates him and renders him or 
her socially useful, if not indispensable. If the translatability and understandability of the 
experts’ language were perfect, the situation of dependence would be less important, but that 
would weaken the expert’s position; obscurity then seems to be a requirement. Of course this is 
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inside some perspective and choice about expertise. Another expert might decide to facilitate 
accessibility to the knowledge because the expert’s contribution never ends in specific advice. 
Transparency and openness on the part of the expert would also be a mark of respect and 
confidence, and this would augment the expert’s credibility. But even with good intentions of 
accessibility, the difficulty of the expert’s language will not be erased completely.  
4. WHAT CAN ORDINARY CITIZENS DO IN FRONT OF EXPERTS?  
Both the experts and the laypersons involved in a discussion have gaps to bridge. Let us look at 
that point with more detail. The experts are both required and contested; they possess valuable 
knowledge, but at the same time, according to Schön’s (1983) classical analysis, as a technical 
expert they are not in a position to treat value conflicts, framing problems at the different levels 
at which they can surface, at least not as problems of their expertise. Foucault and others have 
taught us that knowledge and power go hand in hand, that there is a distribution of knowledge 
which is at the same time a distribution of powers. But these readings in terms of power do not 
account for situations where expertise is not sufficient to really help decision makers transform 
their way of thinking and deciding. For business people, investors and political decision 
makers, science and expertise tend to be only a piece in a vast production system that has made 
the thirty glorious years; they are not advisers and decision makers. Expert knowledge might 
give advantages when it is the property of certain actors, but it does not have the required 
power of influence to modify substantively our ways of producing, as we can see with our very 
slow coming to terms with issues like loss of biodiversity or climate change. The “power” of 
the experts on those issues is quite relative and limited. Experts that can help build or rebuild a 
chain of production and distribution for users are much more listened to than those who just 
say that we have to reorient the whole of economic and political life piece by piece. Radical 
claims toward value (in line with another important figure, that of the intellectual) have the 
force of their clarity and expression, but they would be much more efficient if they were not 
lonely voices. They would need to be something like the result of a common set of expressions, 
built from actual dialogue among a multiplicity of partners, for instance, in face of socio-
technological issues.  
 In concrete collaboration settings, relationships are not always obvious things to have 
with experts. People first have to overcome the gap of the differences that separate them from 
the expert; e.g., they have to go from relative silence and listening postures to voicing 
questions and issues. Confronted with difficulties, they can ask for clarity and explanations of 
the expert’s language, which sometimes comes down to admitting one’s relative ignorance. 
The expert might have to be forced to open him or herself to the preoccupations of the people 
and to come to recognize their competence that can be formulated in terms of practical 
knowledge, different fields of expertise or otherwise. We can confront experts and push them 
outside their specialized categories inside the ordinary language into which at the end, any 
expert language has to be translatable. Reformulations of expert language can also be tested in 
open discussion, provided we have alternative expertise to put in front of that specific group of 
experts. Multiplication of relevant perspectives might help us relativize and resituate otherwise 
the expert’s language and pretentions of exclusivity.  
 Let us say we have a group of people that are required to work together to confront a 
common problem or set of problems; it could be many different things. Here are some 
examples: 1) A Watershed committee having a determined number of representatives of 
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specific groups of users to implement Integrated Water Resources Management. For instance, 
in the Quebec province, according to the Politique nationale de l’eau (2002), the committees 
have to establish a Head Plan on their relative watersheds, and then come up with action 
contracts.5 2) Ethics committees in a health care institution: they have sometimes to decide on 
difficult issues from an ethical point of departure. 3) A group of citizens in a community 
having a consultative role for helping the municipality construct its urban planning for the next 
ten years would also be a case in point, requiring architecture experts, urban planners, 
economists, etc. All these situations involve experts of different kinds working together, and 
having to come to terms sometimes with decisions, sometimes with clear propositions for 
decision makers. Gaps of knowledge and gaps in comprehension are numerous and on all 
sides; they will have to be breached if people are to become able to work efficiently together. 
Their dialogue will have to be constructed in such a way that it will permit each participant to 
express his or her levels and domains of expertise while they all share a common goal, whether 
it be the health of patients or the wellbeing of a water reservoir and of the communities that 
depend on it. We have just reviewed a few strategies that can be used by citizens in case of 
difficulties of understanding. 
 The discussion about interdisciplinarity (Thompson Klein, 1996) is relatively helpful to 
avoid having a too narrow understanding of the competences of the actual listeners in scientific 
communications. That discussion started with the understanding of the limits of actual 
disciplines, constructed with very specific objects and premises. In the discussion on 
collaboration and exchanges between disciplines, we recognize those limits, even though 
academia and research are based on them and constantly refer us back to them. This is why a 
call to interdisciplinarity is not easily met in practice. One problem is that to be able to 
construct significant results, people have to be ready to exchange and partake in methodologies 
and approaches that are genuine to their respective fields. In doing that, they necessarily enter 
into the other’s field of expertise, which might be okay for this particular researcher who is 
willing to do it, but at the macro level, such exchanges easily become controversial, since they 
attack exclusivity and privileges of access. Second problem: most of the time, the difficulties 
that are handled on the field of participative governance are more of the inter-professional kind 
than of a pure problem of scientific complementarity of approaches. The problems are 
practical, not epistemological, even though they bring with them a number of epistemic 
postures (for instance, the sheer existence of this “problem” treated by this “discipline” in 
those “terms” relate epistemology to ontological suppositions that come with the theory-in-
practice that is operational, even though kept in the background, in a disciplinary approach). At 
the inter-professional level, recognition of experts on the field on specific problems does not 
require an important transfer of methodologies and approaches; on the contrary, it can still 
respect frontiers of the different expertise.  
 We might wonder if Grice’s (1989) maxims of conversation, his famous theory of 
implicatures, might help us to discuss those issues of communication and translation in a 
meaningful way. Quality, quantity, relation, and manner under the cooperative principle imply 
a conversational setting and express reciprocal requirements among partners of a 
                                                
5 See for instance explanations and documents from the network of these organizations, the Regroupement des 
organismes de bassin versants du Québec, at http://www.robvq.qc.ca/. In the neighbouring province of 
Ontario, to address water issues at the regional level we have the Conservation Authorities, which are older 
groups that are structured differently than in Québec; see http://conservation-ontario.on.ca/. Countries and 
regional governments arrange themselves around different formulae.  
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conversational exchange. Certainly, we have to aim at the right quantity and the right 
relevance, and the same goes with quality and manner (for instance, what we already 
mentioned about intelligibility), but the criteria evoked are just giving a general idea of what is 
required. By failing to meet the criteria, for instance if the scientist speaking to a public would 
enter into too much detail, therefore lacking quality and relevance, some person might notice 
that this particular criteria has not been met. But that evaluation might differ according to who 
listens and at what time, so the usefulness of Grice’s categories is probably limited if we do not 
specify details about audience, time allowed, and other practical and contextual considerations.  
5. CONCLUSION  
If we understand ethics as an orientation of action based on reflection and discussion, and if we 
understand communication as a complex process that involves co-creators of meaning and of 
actions, it follows that ethical questions about science communication will mostly be 
concerned with relationships between science and society, which means adequate 
communication between people who have specific expertise and others who might have a 
plurality of competences and expertise, but not necessarily that of the scientist. This reading of 
the situation seems prima facie preferable to function only with the dialectic of experts and 
laypersons in a face-to-face situation, which is often supposed in Callon et al. (2001/2011). 
That move on their part is certainly understandable: we overemphasize so much the importance 
of the experts that we fail to recognize other levels of capacities, knowledge and competences. 
A critique of a technical vision of expertise implies and requires the recognition of different 
forms of expertise, among which practical expertise is of the utmost importance. In the context 
in which informed advice of experts seem to be falling on deaf ears, the question of 
communicability of science must again be treated from the many different topoi of social life 
that are relevant. While looking only at one type of situation, suggested by the notion of hybrid 
forums, we think that a basic reflection (as the one offered) can already help identify some 
difficulties and gaps that are faced in those contexts, and maybe furnish some clues as to how 
we can overcome them.  
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